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 Abstract:  In the present paper, we adopt the collective approach to consumer 
behavior-which supposes that each household member is characterized by is/her 
own preferences and that the decision process results in Pareto-efficient outcomes-
and assume, in addition, that agents are egoistic and consumption is either private or 
public. The main results are based on a conditional demand (‘m-demand’) framework 
in which household demands are directly derived from the marginal rates of 
substitution. We show that (i) household demands have to satisfy testable constraints 
and (ii) some elements of the decision process can be retrieved from observed 
behavior. These theoretical considerations are followed by an empirical application 
using the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey. Overall, it turns out that the data are 
consistent with the theoretical model. 
 
Keywords:  Collective Decision, Intra-household Distribution, Demand Analysis, 
Private Good, Public Good, Lindahl Price, GMM 
 
JEL Classification: D11, D12, H41 
 1 Introduction
In microeconomics, the household as a whole is usually considered the ele-
mentary decision unit. In particular, it is characterized by a unique utility
function that is maximized under a budget constraint. This is what we call
the ‘unitary’ approach. However, it seems clear that a household comprising
several adult members does not necessarily behave as a single agent.
Some years ago, Chiappori (1988, 1992) challenged the unitary approach
by explicitly taking into account the bargaining between household members.
He developed a ‘collective’ approach to household labor supply, where each
agent is characterized by his/her own preferences and intra-household deci-
sions result in Pareto eﬃcient outcomes. The key idea underlying this model,
if agents are egoistic (or altruistic in a Beckerian sense) and consumption is
purely private, is very simple. Speciﬁcally, eﬃciency essentially means that
the intra-household decision process can be decentralized by application of
the Theorems of Welfare Economics. In a ﬁrst step, members divide non-
labor income according to some predetermined rule which depends on the
household environment. In a second step, they maximize their utility sub-
ject to their own budget constraints. The main results are then twofold:
a) The collective labor supply has to satisfy testable restrictions under the
form of partial diﬀerential equations;
b) The sharing rule for non-labor income can be retrieved, up to an addi-
tive constant, from the observed labor supply.
In addition, Fortin and Lacroix (1997) and Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix
(2002), have shown that these restrictions are not empirically rejected for
Canada and the United States.1
More recently, the collective approach has been generalized to the analy-
sis of household consumption. Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (1995)
provide the main theoretical results for the case of constant prices. Brown-
ing et alii (1994) use Canadian expenditure data to estimate one of these
models. Browning and Chiappori (1998) extend this theoretical setting to
the case of variable prices. This generates further theoretical restrictions on
1Contributors to the theory of collective labor supply include, among others, Apps and
Rees (1997), Chiappori (1997) for domestic production, and Blundell et alii (2001), Donni
(2001, 2003) for corner solutions.
2household behavior. In particular, they show that, under Pareto eﬃciency,
the substitution matrix of the household demand system has to be equal
to the sum of a symmetric matrix and an outer product. See also Lewbel,
Chiappori and Browning (2003), who estimate equivalence scales in the col-
lective framework, and Chiappori and Ekeland (2001a, 2001b) who develop
a synthesis of collective models with price eﬀects.
In collective models of household consumption, as well as in collective
models of labor supply, the decision process can be decentralized if consump-
tion is purely private and agents are egoistic (or altruistic in a Beckerian
sense). Then, the sharing rule can be identiﬁed, under regularity conditions,
from the observed behavior. This result is essential to the study of welfare
at the individual level, but it crucially relies on the privateness of house-
hold consumption. This is a severe limitation because the existence of joint
consumption, after all, is one of the main ‘economic’ justiﬁcations for the
formation of a couple; see Becker (1991) for example.2 Be that as it may,
when consumption is completely or partially public, the possibility of identi-
fying structural elements of the decision process (e.g., the personal value of
public goods for each household member) has not often been tackled until
now. This is the principal objective of our contribution.
In this paper, we suppose that agents are egoistic (or altruistic in a Beck-
erian sense) and follow the most common line of research on collective mod-
els. However, the great novelty, in contrast with previous work described
above, is that public goods as well as private ones are now considered. We
show that this setting allows us to recover some elements of the household
decision process. More precisely, individual demands for private goods and
individual prices (i.e., Lindahl prices) for public goods are partially identi-
ﬁed. Complete identiﬁcation requires additional assumptions on preferences,
i.e., they must be such that public goods are separable from other goods.
We also derive a set of very simple testable constraints (including a symme-
try property). In principle, these constraints permit an empirical distinction
between a private use and a public use of each category of goods.
The proofs of all the results in this paper are based on a second theoret-
ical innovation, namely, a collective generalization of the marginal demands
that were previously studied by Browning (1999) for the unitary approach.
2In empirical applications, the usual way of dealing with public consumption consists
either in assuming the separability of public goods from private ones or in conditionning
demands on the level of public goods. In both cases, the allocation of public goods in the
household is simply ignored.
3In this generalization, the quantities of private goods and the prices of public
goods are modeled as functions of the prices of private goods, the quanti-
ties of public goods, and the quantities of two reference goods. We assume
that, in these relationships, one reference good is exclusively consumed by
the husband and the other by the wife. The idea is that the levels of these
goods, if they are normal, represent a convenient indicator of the distribu-
tion of resources within the household. The advantages of this speciﬁcation
are twofold. First, it provides a particularly simple and intuitive way to de-
scribe the intra-household decision process. Second, as will become clearer
below, the modeling of these within-period collective marginal demands is
compatible with a life-cycle allocation rule and robust to some controversial
assumptions often made for intertemporal allocations.3
The theoretical considerations are followed by empirical evidence using
the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey. We show that the constraints of
the collective model are globally satisﬁed but the separability of private and
p u b l i cg o o d si sd e ﬁnitively rejected. This implies that the model cannot be
completely identiﬁed. Even in that case, however, useful structural compo-
nents of the model can be recovered.
As indicated above, identiﬁcation results in the context of collective mod-
els with public consumption are rare.4 Still, this question is, undoubtedly,
one of the main topical ones in the research agenda on collective models. Sev-
eral recent and unpublished manuscripts deal with it. Chiappori, Blundell
and Meghir (2002) assume that private goods and leisure are separable from
public ones and investigate the identiﬁcation issue in a collective model of la-
bor supply with private and public goods. However, our results are in some
respects more general, since we also consider the case of public goods not
being separable from private ones and assume that prices of goods may vary.
Chiappori and Ekeland (2001a, 2001b) consider identiﬁcation and testability
in general collective models of consumption with public and private goods.
These authors study the abstract characterization of household demands for
groups of persons and do not consider the empirical implementation of these
3Mazzocco (2003) exploits the advantages of marginal demands to study the intertem-
poral allocation of consumption in a collective context. He also presents empirical evidence
from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey.
4Fong and Zhang (2001) consider a collective model of labor supply where, for each
partner in a marriage, there are two distinct types of leisure: one type is each person’s
private (or independent) leisure and the other type is public (or spousal) leisure. This is
an important, but very speciﬁc, contribution.
4results. More generally, our work was conducted independently of theirs and
our approach (e.g., the use of marginal demands and the underlying idea of
the proofs) is simpler.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the main
theoretical results. We specify the assumptions, deﬁne the collective mar-
ginal demands, and derive the testable properties they have to satisfy. In
Section 3, these theoretical results are extended to demographic-dependent
preferences. We also present further results on the identiﬁcation of the model
and discuss the relationships between marginal demands and more usual de-
mands. In Section 4, the statistical model is speciﬁed. In Section 5, the
data are described and the estimates are presented. In Section 6, concluding
comments are given.
2T h e o r y – B a s i s
2.1 Preferences, Goods and the Decision Process
To begin, there are some goods in households that can reasonably be treated
as private (e.g., alcoholic beverages) and other goods that clearly have a
strong public element (e.g., heating). This distinction is a familiar one and
does not require a detailed discussion. However, if there is a good that only
one person in the household cares about, we prefer to categorize such a good
separately as exclusive rather than public or private.5 It will become clear
below that the concept of exclusivity is essential in the theory which follows.
An example of an exclusive good, which i se x p l o i t e di nt h ee m p i r i c a lp a r t
of this paper, is ‘clothing’. If there are no externalities and if the husband
consumes only men’s clothing and the wife consumes only women’s clothing,
then we can think of men’s and women’s clothing as two exclusive goods.
Another example in the context of labor supply is ‘leisure’. Still, the absence
of externalities is here more debatable.
The main objective of this paper is to analyze consumption of private
and public goods in a uniﬁed framework. To do so, we consider a two-
member household. There are two exclusive goods, one for each person in
the household. We suppose that life-cycle utility is strongly intertemporally
5A pair of exclusive goods and one assignable good (i.e., a private good for which
individual consumption can be observed) can be distinguished by the fact that the prices
of two exclusive goods may independently vary.
5separable and that the within-period preferences of member I (I = A,B)
can be represented by a well-behaved utility function:
uI(xI,qI,q), (1)
where xI, qI and q respectively denote an exclusive good, a K1—vector of
private goods consumed by member I, and a K2—vector of public goods con-
sumed by the household (with K1+K2 = K). Several points must be stressed
at this stage. First, the agents are ‘egoistic’, in the sense that their utility
only depends on their own consumption, but all the results of this paper
can be extended to the case of ‘altruistic’ agents in a Beckerian sense, where
agents actually maximize some ‘altruistic’ index:
UI [uA(xA,qA,q),u B(xB,qB,q)], (2)
where UI(·) is a well-behaved utility function in uA and uB. Second, all
goods, whether public or private, are assumed to be non-durable. Third, the
individual demands for private goods qI are treated as unobservable and the
demand for these goods is only observed at the household level (qA + qB).
Conversely, the ‘individual’ demands for public and exclusive goods q and
xI a r eo b s e r v a b l e . T h em o s ti m p o r t a n tp o i n t ,h o w e v e r ,i st h a te a c hg o o d
can be unambiguously designated as purely public or purely private. This
excludes the possibility of ‘impure’ goods, like leisure in Fong and Zhang’s
(2001) view.6
We assume that there is no domestic production. The household faces a
linear budget constraint and non-negativity restrictions. Thus, the within-
period budget set is given by






q > 0, qI > 0 and xI > 0,
(3)
where rI, p, and P respectively denote the price for the exclusive good, the
K1—vector of prices for private goods, and the K2—vector of prices for public
goods, y denotes household income, and a the within-period variation in
household assets. The notation P (capitalized) for the price of public goods
will become clearer in what follows.
6The notion of public goods in our model may, however, cover the case of externalities
in consumption. Consequently, the marginal utility may be negative for some goods and
one person in the household.
6The originality of the eﬃciency approach lies in the fact that household
decisions are assumed to result in Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes and that no ad-
ditional assumption is made about the decision process.7 That means that
there exists a scalar φ such that household behavior can be described as the
solution to the following program:
max
{xA,xB,qA,qB,q}
φ · uA(xA,qA,q)+( 1− φ) · uB(xB,qB,q),( ¯ P)
subject to (3). The scalar φ can be interpreted as a ‘distribution of power’
index. It generally depends on all the exogenous variables that may aﬀect
the intra-household distribution of power:
φ = φ(rA,r B,y,p,P,s),( 4 )
where s is a vector of distribution factors.8 By deﬁnition, these variables
inﬂuence the decision process but do not aﬀect the (within-period) budget
constraint or (within-period) preferences. Speciﬁcally, the state of the market
for marriage and the speciﬁcf e a t u r e so ft h em a r r i a g ec o n t r a c ta r ee x p e c t e dt o
have an impact on the intra-household distribution of power, as is stressed
by Becker (1991) and illustrated by Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002)
with U.S. data. Moreover, the past and future values of y, rA, rB, p and
P, in a life-cycle context, can also inﬂuence the decision process. Using an
Indonesian survey, Thomas, Contreras and Frankenberg (1997) have shown
that the distribution of wealth by gender at the time of the marriage has a
signiﬁcant impact on household behavior (evaluated here by the children’s
health).
2.2 Collective Marginal Demands
In the unitary approach, the marginal demand (‘m-demand’) for a good is
deﬁned as a function of the level of another reference good rather than total
expenditure or the marginal utility of money. This concept has often been
exploited (either explicitly or implicitly) in life-cycle analysis of household
behavior; see Altonji (1986) and Meghir and Weber (1996), for example. The
theoretical properties of m-demands are studied by Browning (1999).
7The relevance of the eﬃciency hypothesis is discussed, among others, by Browning
and Chiappori (1998).
8The function φ does not depend on a since, in general, a can itself be seen as a function
of all the exogenous variables (including distribution factors).
7We next show that the study of household behavior from a collective
viewpoint is especially simple when a generalization of m-demands is used.
We denote by λ the Lagrangian multiplier of (¯ P) corresponding to the budget
constraint, and we deﬁne φA = φ and φB =1− φ. For an internal solution,



















for the allocation of public goods. We can now deﬁne the system of collective
marginal demands, in terms of quantity, for analyzing private consumption
(cm-demands for private goods). To do that, we eliminate λ and φI in the











We suppose that this system of K1 equations can be uniquely solved for qI
as a function of rI,x I,p and q. We obtain the (individual) cm-demands for
private goods:
qI = qI(rI,x I,p,q). (8)
Since we generally do not observe individual consumption in surveys, we
consider the (aggregate) cm-demands for private goods:
Q =
P
I qI(rI,x I,p,q). (9)
We can also deﬁne the system of collective marginal demands, in terms of
prices, for analyzing public consumption (cm-demands for public goods). We
eliminate λ and φI in the ﬁrst-order condition (6) and obtain Samuelson’s









.( 1 0 )
If we eliminate qI in this expression, using (8), we obtain the (aggregate)
cm-demands for public goods:
P =
P
I pI(rI,x I,p,q), (11)
8where pI corresponds to the (individual) cm-demands for public goods, or
the Lindahl prices, i.e., the price at which each member values his/her public















where D0 =( Q0,−P0). The variables on the left-hand side and the right-hand
side are observable. These relations can be directly estimated with the usual
techniques. Of course, in empirical work, we shall have to account for the
probable endogeneity of xI and q.
As u ﬃcient condition for the existence of the cm-demands for private
goods, and consequently of the cm-demands for public goods, is the normality
of the exclusive goods (conditional on the level of public goods). This is
formally stated as follows.
Assumption A1 Let xI = χI(rI,m,ρI) be the conditional Marshallian
demand for the exclusive good xI, where ρI = rIxI + p0qI is the level of
expenditure on private and exclusive goods. Then, ∂χI/∂ρI > 0.
The underlying intuition is that the demand for exclusive goods, if (con-
ditional) normality is assured, can be seen as a satisfactory indicator of the
allocation of private goods at the individual level; see Browning (1999). For
example, if a person in the household consumes a lot of his/her personal ex-
clusive good, and if this good is normal, then we can expect that this person
will consume a lot of private goods in general. In a certain sense, the pair
of exclusive goods can be seen as ‘suﬃcient statistics’ for the level of private
consumption and the distribution of this consumption within the household.
Incidentally, the cm-approach is in line with the recent recognition that con-
sumption may better reﬂect expected lifetime resources than current income.
In addition, income reported in surveys may also be an insuﬃcient indicator
of material well-being because of misreporting, mismeasurement or (in-kind)
transfers among extended families or friends; see Cutler and Katz (1992) and
Slesnick (1993) for this argument.
9Since public goods can be seen as an externality, Lindahl prices can be negative for
one person (at most) in the household; see Myles (1997) for a discussion of Lindahl prices.
92.3 Testability and Identiﬁability
In what follows, we assume that Assumption A1 is globally satisﬁed. Any
cm-demand has, naturally, speciﬁc properties that can be used to check, ex
post, the adequacy of the theory to observed behavior.
First of all, cm-demands have to be homogeneous. This is formally stated
in the next Proposition.
Proposition 1 Let us assume A1. Then, under collective rationality,
1. The cm-demands for private goods Q(rA,r B,x A,x B,p,q) are homoge-
neous of degree 0 in rA,r B and p;
2. The cm-demands for public goods P(rA,r B,x A,x B,p,q) are homoge-
neous of degree 1 in rA,r B and p.
Proof. These properties directly result from the ﬁrst order conditions (7)
and (10).
One remarkable point here is that the homogeneity of cm-demands does
not follow from the homogeneity of the distribution function φ. In other
words, cm-demands will be homogeneous even if the bargaining power of
household members is aﬀected by money illusion.
The remaining restrictions are twofold. First, the additive structure of
cm-demands can be translated into testable restrictions in the form of partial
diﬀerential equations. This is what we call ‘c-separability’, where ‘c’ stands
for ‘consumption’. Second, household behavior is characterized by a symme-
try property, as in Browning and Chiappori (1998) or Donni (2002), which
results from the optimization problem. We formally introduce the following
Proposition.
Proposition 2 Let us assume A1. Then, under collective rationality, the

























is a symmetric matrix.
10Proof. See Appendix A.
The ﬁrst statement in this Proposition (c-separability) yields a particu-
larly simple test of collective rationality under speciﬁc auxiliary assumptions,
i.e., egoistic agents, absence of domestic production, and absence of impure
goods. Speciﬁcally, it necessitates a veriﬁcation that the four cross-terms in a
second-order approximation of the cm-demands are equal to zero. This may
be realized with single equation methods (or even non-parametric ones). The
second statement is a translation of Slutsky symmetry into the cm-context.
This condition generalizes in two directions a symmetry property previously
derived by Browning (1999, Proposition 1) in the unitary framework: a) the
household is characterized by two decision makers, and b) some demands
are implicitly represented with their prices as dependent variables. Theo-
retically, cm-demands also have to satisfy a property of negativity, which is
more complicated to derive.
One precision is necessary here. Consider the more natural speciﬁcation
of demands, where quantities are expressed as a function of prices and other
variables. The previous Proposition implies, in particular, that the con-
straints imposed on the demands for private goods are diﬀerent from those
imposed on the demands for public goods.10 This has two important conse-
quences. First, it may be seriously misleading to analyze public consump-
tion in a framework initially developed for private consumption. Second,
discrimination between public and private uses of some categories of goods
is theoretically possible.
The next important result of this section concerns the identiﬁcation of
structural elements of the decision process from the estimation of Q and/or
P. Then, we can put forward the next Proposition.
Proposition 3 Let us assume A1. Then, under collective rationality,
1. The individual cm-demands for private goods qI(rI,x I,m) can be re-
trieved up to an additive function gI(m);
2. The individual cm-demands for public goods pI(rI,x I,m) can be re-
trieved up to an additive function hI(m);
10It can be shown, to be more precise, that only c-separability has implications that
permit an empirical distinction between a private use and a public use of goods.
113. The functions gI(m), hI(m) and f0
I(m)=[ g0
I(m),h0
I(m)] have to sat-













Proof. See Appendix A.
Even if the identiﬁcation of the basic components of the model is not
complete–the functions gI(m) and hI(m) remain undeﬁned–this result
proves attractive. It indicates that diﬀerences in tastes between the hus-
band and the wife can be revealed by the estimation of cm-demands. In
addition, more powerful conclusions can be obtained with mild additional
assumptions. For example, let us consider the following statement.
Assumption A2 The level of the exclusive goods is an appropriate indi-
cator of bargaining power, i.e., if φ increases in program ¯ P, then xA increases
and xB decreases.
This assumption says that member A (say) will consume a greater quan-
tity of his/her personal exclusive good when member A’s bargaining power
increases. This seems quite natural and does not merit discussion. We ob-
serve that A1 and A2 are equivalent when there are no public goods.
Corollary 4 Let us assume A1 and A2 and consider a variation in bargain-
ing power that keeps the total expenditure of the household constant. Then,
the sign of the eﬀect of such a variation on the demand for private and public
g o o d si si d e n t i ﬁed.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This Corollary indicates, in particular, that the eﬀect on the demand for
public goods of a shift in bargaining power can be predicted.11
In conclusion, we may observe that the existence of a sharing rule is not
explicitly postulated in the cm-demand context, unlike in the large majority
11The theory here does not say how a shift in bargaining power can be achieved, though,
this point is now well documented in the literature. For example, it is clear that a public
transfer to one person in the household should improve the situation of this person.
12of papers on collective models. However, it is possible to deﬁne the expendi-
ture on private and exclusive goods of each household member as a function
of rI,x I p and q as follows:
ρI(rI,x I,p,q)=xIrI + p
0qI(rI,x I,p,q).
This is a generalization of the sharing rule to public goods. Its derivatives
with respect to ri and xi can obviously be identiﬁed. In particular, we have:
∂ρI
∂xI






= xI + p
0∂Q
∂rI
.( 1 2 )
This result is reminiscent of previous results on the identiﬁcation of the shar-
ing rule with exclusive goods; see Browning et alii (1994) or Donni (2002),
for instance. Moreover, from (12) and the following identity:
xI ≡ χI [rI,m,ρI(rI,x I,m)],
























The idea that exclusive goods are normal, as demanded by Assumption A1,
can thus be assessed with data.
3 Theory–Extensions
3.1 Preference Factors
The present model can be generalized in several ways. To begin with, the
preferences of each agent generally depend on a set of socio-demographic
characteristics. Therefore, we may assume:
uI(xI,qI,q;zI,z), (15)
where zI and z called ‘preference factors’. We must make an important, if a
little artiﬁcial, distinction between factors such as zI =( z
jI
I ) which seem to
13be related to a speciﬁc individual in the household (such as age, race, or level
of education) and factors such as z =( zj) which are common to both agents
(such as the number and age of the children, the state/country of residence).
T h en e x ts t e pi st od e ﬁne, as previously, the cm-demands ‘extended’ to





The distinction between common and speciﬁc preference factors naturally
generates further testable restrictions. This is what we call ‘p-separability’,
where ‘p’ stands for ‘preference’. This is formally expressed in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 5 Let us assume A1. Then, under collective rationality, the




























for any jA and jB.
Proof. It suﬃces to use the deﬁnition of the utility functions (15) and
derive the cm-demands, like before.
This Proposition provides a very simple test of the collective approach
with egoistic agents, provided that a clear distinction between speciﬁca n d
common preference factors exists. This result is very useful in empirical
applications because it is one of the very few results in the literature that
restricts the inﬂuence of preference factors on household behavior. As such, it
provides a simple way of limiting the number of parameters in the functional
form. In addition, it is easy to show that the eﬀect of the speciﬁc preference
factors on the individual cm-demands can be identiﬁed as well.
3.2 Identiﬁcation: Further Results
It has previously been shown that the identiﬁcation of the individual cm-
demands is incomplete: The function fI(p,q) remains undetermined (for
convenience the preference factors are disregarded in the remainder of this
section). A solution to this problem necessitates the addition of a structure
on preferences. Fong and Zhang (2001) and Chiappori, Blundell and Meghir
14(2002) deal with this issue in a labor supply context. Basically, they assume
that preferences are such that public goods are separable from other goods.
Similarly, we assume here:
uI [µI(xI,qI),q]. (16)
This assumption is certainly restrictive. Nevertheless, it should be empha-
sized that such separability has never been tested in the literature until now.
The available tests refer to household level separability, which is deﬁnitely
not implied by our framework.
If the utility functions are of the form (16), the ﬁrst-order conditions for















The remarkable point is that, under the assumption of separability, these
equations do not depend on the level of public consumption. This is suﬃcient
to identify some important elements of the decision process. We formally
have the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 Let us assume A1. The preferences have the form repre-
sented by (16). Then, under collective rationality,
1. The individual cm-demands for private goods qI(rI,x I,p,q) can be re-
trieved up to an additive function gI(p);
2. The individual cm-demands for public goods pI(rI,x I,p,q) can be ex-

















3. The separability of preferences generates further testable restrictions on
cm-demands.
15Proof. See Appendix A.
The fact that the function gI(p) remains undetermined is not of great
concern here. The important point for our purpose is that the individual
demands for private goods can be derived when prices are constant (e.g.,
over a short period of time) and the valuation of public goods by household
members is exactly identiﬁed. Moreover, some elements of the individual
preferences can probably be retrieved too, but the proof of this is beyond our
scope here.
One trivial consequence of this result is that the structural components of
the model are completely identiﬁed if consumption is purely public (K1 =0 ).
The underlying intuition is straightforward if we recall that individual prices
are linearly homogeneous too. Then,




i.e., the individual cm-demands pI(rI,x I,q) are exactly identiﬁed. Chiappori
and Ekeland (2001b) present another version of this result.
3.3 Relationship with ‘Traditional’ Collective Models
Generally, the collective models that are used in empirical applications are
unconditional in the sense that each demand is represented as a function
of income, prices, distribution and preference factors (they are eventually
conditional on the level of public goods). However, the properties of the
cm-demands that we develop above can be expressed in terms of these more
traditional collective demands. To do that, we have to specify the form of
the demands for the exclusive goods.
Typically, the demands for the exclusive goods depend on all the variables
in the budget constraint and the bargaining function:
xI = x
∗
I(rA,r B,y,m,s).( 1 8 )
These relations have theoretical properties which are studied in depth in
Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002). In particular, it can be shown that
there exists a sharing rule, ρI, such that the demands can be written as
follows:
xI = χI [rI,m,ρI(rA,r B,y,m,s)],
16with
P
I ρI = y − a. This speciﬁcation generates a set of testable restric-
tions and allows us to identify some elements of the decision process. One
underlying diﬃculty in the estimation task here is that the demands for the
exclusive goods may be functions of numerous variables that are not neces-
sarily observed by the economist (e.g., past or future values of y).
Be that as it may, if these demands were estimated, they could be intro-










Similar expressions can be found in Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori
(1995), for instance. However, the originality of the theory here is that the
structure of demands for public goods is also speciﬁed. Moreover, using
Proposition 3 and Relation (18), it is easy to compute the eﬀect of most
exogenous variables on the individual traditional demands. For example,
diﬀerentiating d∗


















∂s0 ,( 2 1 )
where the right-hand side derivatives are known. This relation allows us to
measure the impact of a change in y or s on dI.
Several points must be stressed at this stage. First, the constraints given
in Proposition 3 necessarily have a transposition in the form of restrictions on
the partial derivatives of the demands (20). Still, these restrictions, in partic-
ular the symmetry restriction, may be extraordinarily complicated. Second,
it can be shown that the demands in (20) must satisfy additional constraints.








where θj =( ∂xI/∂sj)/(∂xI/∂y) is a scalar and sj is a typical element of
s. The underlying intuition is clear: y and s inﬂuence the cm-demands only
through a variation in the level of the exclusive goods. This ‘distribution’
property, in Browning and Chiappori’s (1998) terminology, will be implicitly
used for the construction of the instruments in the empirical part of this
17paper. Third, in the literature on collective models, there exists another
concept of demands. In y-demands (see Bourguignon, Browning and Chi-
appori (1995), Donni (2002) and Donni and Moreau (2003)), the quantity
of goods is a function of various exogenous variables, total income, and one
exclusive good. The properties of these demands can also be related to the
cm-framework.
4S t a t i s t i c a l S p e c i ﬁcation
In this section, we use a parametrization of the cm-demand system to derive
the implications of the collective setting. We follow Browning (1999) for
the individual cm-demands and model relative expenditures, i.e., the ratio of
expenditures on the good to be modeled to expenditure on the conditioning







where ¯ stands for the Hadamard product, i.e., the element-by-element prod-
uct, and the function fI(m,z) is not identiﬁable, as previously explained.
Since dI is not observed, the following transformation from individual to









The role of the econometrician is then to select a functional form for the
component ∆I of the cm-demands that can be identiﬁed. After considerable
experimentation, we adopted a variation of the AI Demand System. The





n=1 cn(lnrIxI − lnΦn)
n + dlnrJxJ, (24)
with J 6= I,w h e r ea,B,cn and d are conformable vectors and matrices of
parameters12 and Φn are functions deﬁned as follows:
lnΦ1 =0 and lnΦn = c
0
n lnm if n>1.
12A positive translation must be applied to xI and q for the computation of the log-
arithms in the functional form. The reason is that, for some households, the observed
expenditure on these goods is simply equal to zero during the period of observation.
18One advantage of this form is that the ﬂexibility of the model can be arbitrar-
ily increased by choosing a large N. However, it is advisable to be cautious
and perform some simple empirical tests, because the levels and prices of
t h ee x c l u s i v eg o o d se n t e rt h ef u n c t i o n a lf o r mo n l yt h r o u g he x p e n d i t u r e so n
them. Moreover, the individual demands are assumed, for the sake of par-
simony, to have the same parameters (except for the intercepts, as is quite
usual in econometrics). This assumption must also be carefully examined.
The next step is to make some allowance for observable heterogeneity and
derive the theoretical constraints. To do this, we choose a functional form
for the index a∗
I and allow for the fact that diﬀerent people will have diﬀerent
tastes. A linear speciﬁcation is adopted:
a
∗
I(zI,zJ,z)=aI + a1zI + a2zJ + a3z, (25)
where aI,a1,a2 and a3 are conformable vectors and matrices of parameters.
The parameters of the functional forms (24) and (25) then have to satisfy
several constraints for the model to be consistent with the theory. First, the



















where the dimension of B11 is K1×K1, the dimension of B12 is K1×K2 and so
on. The constraints are summarized in Table 1. Most of them are intuitive.
The derivation of the symmetry restriction is tedious but not diﬃcult. The
separability of public goods only implies that the cm-demands for private
goods do not depend on the quantity of public goods. Other implications of
this separability are automatically satisﬁed.
To complete this speciﬁcation, we also have to introduce unobservable
heterogeneity. The most satisfactory treatment would be to develop a fully
stochastic model, but we adopt the more conventional approach of simply









where ε is a stochastic term. Potential sources of such heterogeneity in
the cm-context comes only from preferences and measurement/optimization
19Table 1: List of constraints
Name of constraints Parameter restrictions
Homogeneity B11ι + c1
1 + d1= 0,
B21ι + c2
1 + d2= 0,
c1
nι = ι,n=2 ,...,N,
with ι =( 1 ,...,1)0
C-separability d = 0
Symmetry B = B
0
P-separability a2= 0
Separability of public goods B12= 0,
c2
n= 0,n=1 ,...,N
errors.13 This implies the probable endogeneity of the level of exclusive and
public goods, i.e.,
E(ε|xA,x B,q) 6=0 .
The basic reason for this endogeneity is that the level of all goods are vari-
ables of choice and are simultaneously determined by unobservable members’
tastes. To make things clearer, let us consider the example of ‘clothing’ and
‘personal care services’. If some persons take particular care of their phys-
ical appearance and others do not, then the error terms on ‘clothing’ and
‘personal care services’ are expected to be positively correlated. There is
another important cause of endogeneity, though. In surveys, observations
on expenditure are generally contaminated by the infrequency of purchases.
These ‘errors in variables’ create another form of endogeneity.
However that may be, there is a natural assumption which permits the
econometric identiﬁcation of the model, i.e.,
E(ε|rA,r B,y,p,P,s,zA,zB,z)=0 . (26)
One point must be stressed here. The natural instruments for the level of
exclusive goods are income and distribution factors, since the theory states
that, conditional on the level of the exclusive goods, income and distribution
factors should not aﬀect the cm-demands. The exclusion of these variables
13Contrary to more usual collective demands, the heterogeneity related to the decision
process is directly summarized here by the level of the exclusive goods and does not enter
the error terms.
20from the cm-demands is, therefore, a prediction that can also be tested. This
restriction corresponds to (22) in the more traditional context.
5D a t a a n d R e s u l t s
5.1 The Consumer Expenditure Survey
The data are drawn from the ‘Interview’ component of the ‘Consumer Ex-
penditure Survey’. This survey, which has been extensively used since the
early eighties (see Nelson (1988), or Meghir and Weber (1996), for example),
contains global estimates of total spending on food at home and other items
for the three-month period immediately preceding the interview. It is a ro-
tating panel. Households are interviewed ﬁve times, but the ﬁrst quarter of
expenditure data are used only for bounding purposes.
The complete sample includes about 100,000 households from 1980 to
1999. The data used in this study come from each of the overlapping 12-
month periods January 1980—December 1980, February 1980—January 1981,
and so on through the 12 month period April 1998—March 1999. We then
select a subsample of married couples without children, since children are ex-
pected to increase problems related to domestic production. We also restrict
the sample to couples in which the husband and wife both work full-time
(whose yearly labor supply falls between 1500 and 3000 hours) and who are
less than 65 years old. These selection rules and the exclusion of missing
data14 leave us with a total of 2,604 cases for the empirical analysis. The
construction of the sample is more precisely described in Appendix B.
We follow Browning et alii (1994) and suppose that ‘men’s clothing’
(MCLO) and ‘women’s clothing’ (WCLO) are exclusive goods. One notable
(and especially important in the cm-context) feature of the Consumer Expen-
diture Survey is that, since expenditures are recorded over the year, there are
far fewer zeros for goods such as clothing than one ﬁnds in surveys based on
short diaries. We then model the demand for four private goods: ‘food and
beverages at home’ (FDAH), ‘food and beverages away from home’ (REST),
‘alcoholic beverages and tobacco’ (VICE), ‘personal care services’ (CARE),
and the demand for two public goods: ‘oil fuel and utility natural gas ser-
14The most important source of incomplete observations is attrition in the panel and
the fact that the region of residence is not recorded for households living in rural areas.
These observations are simply removed from our sample.
21vice’ (FUEL) and ‘electricity, water and sewer and trash collection services’
(UTIL).15 We assume that the preferences for these goods are separable from
those for all other goods (allowing the exception of labor force status since
we select full-time working members).
Prices (‘Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers’) are taken from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The price of composite goods is created as
the weighted geometric mean of the component prices with budget shares av-
eraged across the sample for weights. Moreover, since the series are recorded
over twenty years at the region level (North, South, West and Midwest), the
variation in prices in our data is appreciable; see Appendix B.16
5.2 Parameter Estimates and Test Statistics
Before presenting estimates of the parameters, we have to address some
econometric issues. The equations are estimated using conventional iterated
GMM techniques to allow for the probable endogeneity of the conditioning
goods. This estimation method is also consistent with heteroscedasticity
of unknown form in the errors. The econometric tests are performed with
LR-type tests. The corresponding statistics are computed as the diﬀerence
between the J-statistics computed for the constrained and the unconstrained
model; see Newey and West (1987).17
For the most general speciﬁcation, and after numerous tests, we ﬁnally
retained ﬁfteen factors of preference in the a∗
I index. We take the age, the
square of the age, the years of education for each spouse, and dummies for
black households, Hispanic households18 and home owner households. We
15Such a classiﬁcation–even if it is always debatable in the end–seeks a broad con-
sensus. Therefore, the classiﬁcation of goods such as ‘entertainment’ or ‘transportation’
as public or private seems deﬁnitively too conjectural. A more ambitious line of attack
consists in letting data determine the best classiﬁcation of goods. This is, however, beyond
the scope of this paper.
16We use prices recorded at the country level for CARE (and for MCLO and WCLO and
components of VICE, FUEL, UTIL after January, 1998) since the regional information is
not available.
17Following the common practice (see Hayashi, 1998), we computed the J-statistics with
the weighting matrix of the unconstrained model. We ascertained, however, that the tests
are robust to the choice of other consistent weighting matrices.
18In principle, in cm-demands these variables can be considered speciﬁc factors of pref-
erences. However, it is made diﬃcult because there is a strong collinearity between the
characteristics of the partners. That is, mixed marriages are rare.
22also include the logarithm of time and its square to allow for possible shifts
in taste, and four dummies for the region of residence.19 As a preliminary, we
decided that the optimal number of terms in expenditure, i.e., the value of N,
must be equal to 2.W ew i l lr e t u r nt ot h a tl a t e r .T h u s ,w eh a v et w e n t y - ﬁve
(free) parameters per equation for the most general model.
The usual technique for choosing instruments in GMM consists in se-
lecting the order of a polynomial for the exogenous variables. The set of
instruments in our application includes the logarithms of the prices of the
public and private goods, a second-order polynomial in the logarithms of the
prices of the exclusive goods, the socio-demographic variables used in the es-
timation process, a third-order polynomial in the logarithm of total income
(composed of spouses’ earnings and non-labor incomes), a second-order poly-
nomial in the logarithms of the wife’s and husband’s earnings, and dummies
f o rn e g a t i v ew i f e ’ sa n dh u s b a n d ’ se a r n i n g s . 20 Spouses’ earnings can be seen
here as distribution factors. In all, we have thirty-six instruments per equa-
tion. This gives eleven overidentifying restrictions per equation and a total
of sixty-six degrees of freedom for the six-good system. The explanatory
power and the possible endogeneity of these instruments have been exten-
sively investigated, but we have not found any evidence of non-orthogonality
or weakness.
To begin, we present the description of the diﬀerent models we estimated
and the corresponding set of J-statistics in Table 2. These models are nested
and the diﬀerent constraints are successively tested. The test of overiden-
tifying restrictions for the unconstrained model indicates that the set of in-
struments, as a whole, is not rejected by the data at the usual levels.21
This means, in particular, that household demands, when conditioned on
the level of two exclusive goods, are not inﬂuenced by the various incomes
of the household. Moreover, the diﬀerent sets of collective restrictions (ho-
mogeneity, c-separability, symmetry, p-separability) are not rejected at any
19To avoid collinearity between these variables and the individual constants, we assume
that the sum of the parameters for the region dummies is equal to zero.
20The fact is that incomes may include loss from business and, therefore, may be neg-
ative. Thus, the logarithm of incomes is not computable for all observations, and the
inverse hyperbolic sine of earnings and total income is actually used. This transformation
is approximately logarithmic for high values of incomes and linear for values close to zero.
21The power of the overidentiﬁcation test can be limited if the number of overidentifying
restrictions is high. However, the computation of J-statistics with subsets of instruments
conﬁrmed the hypothesis of exogeneity.
23Table 2: J-stats and tests of constraints
The models and their characteristics J-stats D.F. p-value
Model I (unconstrained) 74.30 66 0.23
Model II (Model I + homogeneity) 82.16 73 0.35
Model III (Model II + c-separability) 87.50 79 0.50
Model IV (Model III + symmetry) 104.54 94 0.32
Model V (Model IV + p-separability) 122.72 112 0.44
Model VI (Model V + separability
of public consumption) 369.69 122 0.00
Notes: The ﬁrst row of the last column indicates the p-value for the test of
overidentiﬁcation. The other rows indicate the p-value for the test of one model
against the preceding one (e.g., the second row gives the p-value for the test of
homogeneity and so on).
conventional level. Thus, the data are consistent with the collective setting.22
However, the idea that preferences could be separable in public and private
goods is much more unlikely. This assumption is deﬁnitively rejected and,
of course, this casts doubts on the possibility of identifying individual cm-
demands. Incidentally, the numerous empirical studies that are implicitly
based on this assumption of separability could be seriously misleading.23
We now turn to the parameter estimates of the various models. To save
on space, we focus more particularly on two speciﬁcations. We ﬁrst present
the estimates of the parameters of Model II in Table 3.24 This table provides
the estimates of the parameters of the functional form of individual demands
when homogeneity is imposed. Except for the constant, these parameters are
the same for both household members. The number of coeﬃcients which are
signiﬁcant at the 5% (10%) level is equal to 31 (35) out of 150. Speciﬁcally,
we must make two remarks here. First, the estimates of d, in contrast with
those of c1 and c2,a r en o ts i g n i ﬁcant at the 10% level. That conﬁrms the
formal test presented in Table 2. Second, the estimates of B are not very
22We also tested c-separability in a more general model with a squared term in the
expenditure of the partner. The conclusions are not altered.
23To the best of our knowledge, we here present the ﬁrst empirical test–and the ﬁrst
rejection at the same time–of this type of separability at the household level.
24For the sake of eﬃciency, the estimation procedure for this model is based on the
weighting matrix computed with the parameter estimates of Model V. As indicated in
Table 2, this is the most constrained model not rejected by the data.
24signiﬁcant. Still, a careful examination of these estimates and their standard
deviations reveals that the price-and-quantity eﬀects are, as required by the
theory, approximately symmetrical.
We next consider the estimates for Model V. For this model, a greater
proportion of parameters are precisely estimated: 39 (49) coeﬃcients out
of 132 are signiﬁcant at the 5% (10%) level. In particular, the majority of
the estimates of c1 and c2 are very signiﬁcant (with t-tests higher than 2
in general). Still, the estimates of B remain imprecise: only 9 coeﬃcients
out of 36 are signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This lack of precision can, of
course, be explained by the strong collinearity in prices. Furthermore, the
dependent variable here is the ratio of expenditures on one private/public
good to expenditures on both exclusive goods. Also, the estimates of the
parameters will not be very signiﬁcant if the expenditures in the numerator
and the denominator are strongly correlated. This may explain, in particular,
why the estimates are generally not signiﬁcant for the CARE equation.
As to the socio-demographic variables, we observe that racial and ethnic
minorities have similar patterns of consumption for the REST and VICE
equations. These patterns are more diﬀerent for the CARE and UTIL equa-
tions. We also point out that more educated people spend relatively more on
CARE and REST than on MCLO and WCLO and, quite surprisingly, home
owners spend relatively less on FUEL. Finally, age is an important variable
to explain the demands for FDAH, REST or VICE and the region dummies
are, in general, not very signiﬁcant.
Before turning to a more detailed investigation of these estimates, several
empirical tests were conducted to check the adequacy of the present spec-
iﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, a third-order term in (lnrIxI − Φn) was introduced
into the functional form. However, the resulting decrease in the J-statistics
turned out to be quite small–going from 122.72 to 119.21–and the present
speciﬁcation is not rejected (the χ2— statistic for this test is equal to 3.51 with
a p-value = 0.74). At the same time, it conﬁrms our preliminary intuition
that N must be equal to 2.
Other tests were performed. We checked whether the eﬀect of the level
o ft h ee x c l u s i v eg o o d sa n dt h ee ﬀect of prices are distinct. We also examined
the assumption that, except for constants, individual demands are the same
for both members. All in all, the functional form that we adopted seems to
conveniently ﬁt the data.
25Table 3: Estimates of the parameters for Model II
Parameters and labels Dependent variables (m ¯ D/ΣIrIxI)
FDAH REST VICE CARE FUEL UTIL
aA: intercept (men) 8.77 0.10 1.14 1.19 -0.43 -1.51
(2.96) (3.05) (1.53) (0.75) (0.55) (1.06)
aB: intercept (women) 8.64 -5.12 2.83 -0.66 0.11 -0.50
(1.85) (1.70) (0.99) (0.48) (0.36) (0.74)
a1: North -0.30 -0.05 -0.13 -0.04 0.01 -0.01
(0.28) (0.32) (0.17) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09)
a1: Midwest -0.25 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05
(0.16) (0.17) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
a1: West 0.41 0.00 0.16 0.01 -0.12 0.04
(0.31) (0.33) (0.19) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10)
a1: South 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.012 -0.08
(0.17) (0.18) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
a1: log. of a trend -0.79 -0.43 -0.43 0.02 -0.25 -0.23
0.39 (0.40) (0.24) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11)
a1: log. of a trend exp2 0.32 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.10 0.09
0.13 (0.14) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
a1: black -0.28 -0.76 -0.32 0.17 0.03 -0.13
0.20 (0.19) (0.10) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08)
a1: Spanish-speaking -0.03 -0.39 -0.35 -0.03 -0.01 0.05
0.06 (0.22) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
a1: home owner 0.03 -0.26 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.06
0.06 (0.63) (0.31) (0.16) (0.11) (0.20)
a2: education in decades 0.29 -0.47 -0.78 -0.11 0.07 0.09
(0.59) (0.58) (0.51) (0.13) (0.10) (0.19)
a2: age -0.07 -0.10 -0.09 -0.06 0.13 -0.09
(0.25) (0.25) (0.14) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07)
a2: age in decades exp2 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.07 -0.15 0.11
(0.30) (0.30) (0.17) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09)
a3: education in decades -0.35 0.53 0.77 0.14 -0.08 -0.12
of the partner (0.54) (0.57) (0.50) (0.13) (0.10) (0.18)
a3: age of the partner 0.23 0.18 0.19 0.06 -0.13 0.09
(0.26) (0.26) (0.15) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08)
a3: age in decades of the -0.29 -0.19 -0.20 -0.06 0.16 -0.10
partner exp2 (0.30) (0.03) (0.17) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09)
B: price of FDAH 10.70 -3.57 2.05 0.03 0.25 -0.72
(3.78) (3.21) (1.64) (0.77) (0.64) (1.06)
B: price of REST -2.38 0.15 -0.94 0.50 -0.12 -0.83
(3.26) (3.15) (1.85) (0.76) (0.74) (0.86)
B: price of VICE 0.47 -1.56 -1.13 -0.28 0.02 -0.63
(1.63) (1.56) (0.91) (0.37) (0.28) (0.49)
B: price of CARE -1.79 2.03 2.27 -0.39 -0.61 0.10
(2.97) (3.35) (2.03) (0.82) (0.91) (0.80)
B: quantity of FUEL 0.32 0.06 0.17 -0.00 -0.72 0.02
(0.65) (0.64) (0.35) (0.15) (0.13) (0.19)
B: quantity of UTIL -2.49 0.62 -0.96 -0.11 0.01 -1.03
(0.99) (0.90) (0.49) (0.25) (0.20) (0.37)
c1: expenditure on clothing -5.30 3.24 -1.41 0.15 0.14 2.42
(1.68) (1.56) (1.05) (0.42) (0.35) (0.61)
c2: expenditure on clothing 1.23 -0.65 0.44 -0.03 0.02 -0.24
exp2 (0.28) (0.25) (0.18) (0.07) ( 0.07) (0.09)
d: expenditure on clothing -1.71 -0.29 -0.84 -0.00 0.33 -0.34
of the partner (1.44) (1.44) (0.83) (0.36) (0.29) (0.41)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses
26Table 4: Estimates of the parameters for Model V
Parameters and labels Dependent variables (m ¯ D/ΣIrIxI)
FDAH REST VICE CARE FUEL UTIL
aA: intercept (men) 6.43 2.25 1.18 1.71 -0.36 -1.96
(2.17) (1.84) (1.03) (0.54) (0.40) (0.88)
aB: intercept (women) 9.91 -5.01 2.40 -0.58 0.02 -0.66
(1.65) (1.54) (0.86) (0.47) (0.35) (0.70)
a1: North -0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.03
(0.13) (0.12) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
a1: Midwest -0.22 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.075 0.07
(0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
a1: West 0.10 -0.04 -0.12 0.00 -0.08 -0.05
(0.16) (0.14) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
a1: South 0.14 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.05
(0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
a1: log. of a trend -0.62 -0.36 -0.22 0.03 -0.28 -0.29
(0.32) (0.32) (0.20) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
a1: log. of a trend exp2 0.18 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.09
(0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
a1: black -0.02 -0.70 -0.27 0.17 0.03 -0.07
(0.19) (0.15) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07)
a1: Spanish-speaking -0.10 -0.44 -0.36 -0.04 -0.03 0.07
(0.17) (0.19) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
a1: home owner 0.09 0.23 0.05 0.17 0.15 -0.01
(0.33) (0.29) (0.18) (0.11) (0.08) (0.16)
a2: education in decades -0.04 0.09 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.03
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
a2: age 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
a2: age in decades exp2 -0.12 -0.07 -0.09 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
a3: education in decades 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
of the partner ––––––
a3: age of the partner 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
––––––
a3: age in decades of the 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
partner exp2 ––––––
B: price of FDAH 8.38 -3.38 1.82 0.06 0.05 -1.63
(2.95) (1.87) (0.94) (0.57) (0.38) (0.75)
B: price of REST -3.38 0.19 0.13 0.28 -0.24 0.09
(1.87) (1.46) (0.73) (0.49) (0.26) (0.48)
B: price of VICE 1.82 0.13 -0.07 0.06 -0.21 -0.50
(0.94) (0.73) (0.57) (0.21) (0.16) (0.32)
B: price of CARE 0.06 0.28 0.06 -0.41 -0.08 -0.23
(0.57) (0.49) (0.21) (0.51) (0.09) (0.19)
B: quantity of FUEL 0.05 -0.24 -0.21 -0.08 -0.65 -0.02
(0.38) (0.26) (0.16) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13)
B: quantity of UTIL -1.63 0.09 -0.50 -0.23 -0.02 -0.74
(0.75) (0.48) (0.32) (0.19) (0.13) (0.35)
c1: expenditure on clothing -6.89 2.78 -1.94 0.01 0.48 2.27
(1.07) (0.87) (0.56) (0.28) (0.25) (0.44)
c2: expenditure on clothing 1.12 -0.50 0.36 0.02 0.01 -0.28
exp2 (0.24) (0.22) (0.15) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
d: expenditure on clothing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
of the partner ––––––
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses
27Table 5: Median of the distribution of cm-demand elasticities computed from
the estimates for Model V
Dependent variables (D)
FDAH REST VICE CARE FUEL UTIL
Price of FDAH 0.01 -1.50 0.96 0.38 -0.18 -1.95
(0.49) (0.95) (1.12) (0.94) (0.64) (0.96)
Price of REST -0.69 -4.40 1.90 2.05 -0.96 -1.24
(0.44) (1.64) (1.32) (1.72) (0.65) (1.11)
Price of VICE 0.17 0.64 0.75 -0.40 -0.75 -0.85
(0.19) (0.45) (1.17) (0.64) (0.33) (0.62)
Price of CARE 0.03 0.39 -0.23 -0.01 0.48 0.31
(0.08) (0.33) (0.36) (1.22) (0.18) (0.21)
Quantity of FUEL -0.02 -0.25 -0.57 0.64 1.10 -0.12
(0.07) (0.17) (0.25) (0.24) (0.51) (0.23)
Quantity of UTIL -0.26 -0.30 -0.63 0.53 -0.12 -1.09
(0.12) (0.29) (0.47) (0.37) (0.23) (0.85)
Expenditure 0.17 2.35 0.15 0.28 -0.22 -0.11
on men’s clothing (0.03) (0.48) (0.14) (0.09) (0.05) (0.03)
Expenditure 0.35 -0.54 0.32 0.44 -0.05 -0.06
on women’s clothing (0.16) (0.41) (0.22) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11)
Notes: Standard deviations (computed by bootstrap) are in parentheses.
5.3 Elasticities and Identiﬁcation
As previously shown, the separability of the public goods from the other
goods is clearly rejected by our data. Consequently the complete identiﬁ-
cation of the individual cm-demands is not possible. Still, some interesting
information on the decision process can be obtained. As a ﬁrst step, we may
show, using (13), that the income elasticites for the exclusive goods are posi-
tive for the large majority of observations (all the income-elasticities for men
computed from the sample are positive, and less than 5% of these elasticities
for women are negative) and conclude that these goods are (conditionally)
superior, as required by A1.
We next turned to the computation of the elasticities of the cm-demands
but, as a preliminary, we checked the equality of the individual intercepts,
aA = aB, for each equation. It turns out that only the intercepts for REST are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other. We therefore imposed the conditions
aA = aB for all goods except REST–this is restrictive but greatly increases
the precision of the estimates–and we computed, for each observation, the
28price-and-quantity and expenditure elasticities from the parameter estimates
of the constrained model. The median of the distribution of these elasticities
is given in Table 5. We ﬁrst remark, to make things clearer, that a rise in
men’s and women’s clothing expenditure, if A1 is satisﬁed, should increase
(decrease) the demand for any superior private (public) good.25
In this context, the ﬁrst conclusion we can draw is that the majority of
goods are superior. The only exception is the demand for REST by women,
but it is not very signiﬁcant. To make up for that, the elasticity of the
demand for REST by men is positive and very large. More precisely, if A2
obtains, an increase of the bargaining power of the husband can be shown
to imply an increase in the demand for REST by the household. Similarly,
an increase in the bargaining power of the husband can be shown to imply
an increase in the demand for FUEL and UTIL. Such a result, linking the
intra-household distribution of power to the demand for public goods, has
never been seen in the literature.
The second notable point is that the price-and-quantity elasticities are
now fairly well estimated: 19 parameters out of 36 are signiﬁcant at the
20% level. The own price-and-quantity elasticities for REST and FUEL are
signiﬁcant and have the expected sign. The other own price-and-quantity
elasticities are not signiﬁcant.
6C o n c l u s i o n
One of the main topical themes of research in collective models concerns the
structure of demands for public goods. Our objective in this paper was to
develop and estimate a simple collective model of household behavior with
public and private goods. In a few words, our main results can be summarized
as follows.
25Let us ﬁrst recall that the cm-demands for public goods are deﬁned as a negative func-
tion −P of q and other variables. Then, this property directly stems from the deﬁnition









with ∂xI/∂ρI > 0 because of A1. However, our deﬁnition of ‘superiority’ for public goods
is slightly diﬀerent from the most common one since it is expressed in terms of prices or
marginal rates of substitution. The deﬁnitions are equivalent when there is only one public
good.
29F i r s t ,w ep r o p o s ew h a tw ec a l la‘ c m - demand’ framework, in which house-
hold demands are directly derived from the marginal rates of substitution.
This framework, which turns out to be especially proﬁtable for investigating
t h ep r o p e r t i e so fc o l l e c t i v ed e m a n d s ,i se x t e n s i v e l ye x p l o i t e di nt h i sp a p e r .
Second, we show, using this framework, that household demands for pub-
lic and private goods have to satisfy testable constraints and that some ele-
ments of the decision process can be retrieved from observed behavior. More-
over, the identiﬁcation is complete if preferences are assumed to be such that
public and private goods are separable. We also deﬁne the new concepts of
‘speciﬁc’ and ‘common’ factors of preferences.
Third, we implement this theoretical model and present empirical results
with U.S. data. It turns out that, overall, the data are consistent with the
theoretical model. This contribution is appreciable because, in fact, collective
models of demand accounting for variable prices are rarely estimated.
We also present the ﬁrst test, to the best of our knowledge, of the sep-
arability of public and private consumption in preferences. The evidence
strongly suggests that such a separability is rejected. It makes one wonder,
then, how individual demands could be retrieved in a collective model with
public and private goods. The cm-framework can again furnish a solution. To
demonstrate, let us recall that cm-demands result from the sole characteris-
tics of the utility functions. That is to say, the decision process is completely
summarized by the levels of exclusive goods. Let us now assume that the
preferences of single and married persons are indistinguishable. Then, under
this assumption, the m-demands obtained from a sample of singles and the
individual cm-demands obtained from a sample of couples should be iden-
tical in every respect. Identiﬁcation of the structural model then follows in
a simple way. However, our approach in the present paper is more general
a n dd o e sn o tp o s t u l a t es u c has i m i l a r i t yb e t w e e ns i n g l ea n dm a r r i e dp e r s o n s .
This assumption is indeed strong. Still, it is not unusual (see Lewbel, Chi-
appori and Browning (2003) or Couprie (2003) for example) and certainly
deserves greater attention in future.
Be that as it may, one of the main limitations of our model is that goods
are assumed to be pure, either private or public. More realistically, how-
ever, most goods in households should certainly be regarded as impure. For
example, expenditures on ‘telephone services’ include the rental as a public
element and the actual use of telephone as a private element. Nevertheless,
identiﬁcation of the structural model undoubtedly raises further diﬃculties
in this case. Yet, these diﬃculties are not insurmountable, as was shown
30by Fong and Zhang (2001) in a labor supply context, but more structure is
probably necessary here. This is one of the most promising directions for
future research.
Future research should also try to simultaneously estimate the system of
cm-demands and the demands for exclusive goods, yielding a deeper under-
standing of the variables that inﬂuence the distribution of resources within
the household. One drawback of such an investigation, however, is that the
theory does not specify what distribution factors enter the bargaining. In
addition, the most important distribution factors are possibly not observed
by the econometrician. In fact, the sharing rule, which is not explained by
the theory, cannot be easily interpreted; see Donni (2003) for more detail.
One ﬁnal comment is that most public goods in households are to some
extent durable. This is obvious when you think to lodging or appliances.
Thus, the theory should be expanded to cover the case of durable goods.
Appendix
AL i s t o f P r o o f s
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The ﬁrst statement in Proposition 2 is trivial and the proof is straightforward.
We thus turn to the second statement.
Let us consider the (conditional) compensated demands and prices for
each household member. They are deﬁned in the usual way as follows:
xI = x
c
I(rI,m,u I), qI = q
c
I(rI,m,u I), pI = p
c
I(rI,m,u I).
The latter term is a virtual price as in Neary and Roberts (1980). Then, a
result by Madden (1991, Lemma 1) indicates that the matrix

































        

31is symmetrical. The next step is to show that this result directly implies the
symmetry of individual cm-demands.












Proof. We simply generalize here the argument of Browning (1999) and
show that the individual cm-demands have to satisfy a symmetry restriction.




I(rI,m,u I) ⇔ uI = ψI(rI,m,x I).
The inversion is possible if A1 is assumed. The function ψI(rI,m,x I) has
some properties of a preference representation but it is not a valid represen-
tation in the sense that there is a one-to-one mapping from preferences to





































I)0 =[ ( qc
I)0,−(pc
I)0]. This procedure is very close to Cook’s method
for deriving Marshallian demands from the cost function. Taking the deriv-
































































































Since right-hand side is symmetric, so is the left-hand side.k
Since D =
P
I dI, ∂dI/∂xI = ∂D/∂xI and ∂dI/∂rI = ∂DI/∂rI,t h e
proof of the second statement in Proposition 2 follows from Lemma 8.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of the ﬁrst and the second statement is straightforward. The














where the right-hand side of these expressions is known. Similarly, the deriv-














Since the derivatives of D with respect to p and q are not identiﬁed, the
individual cm-demands are identiﬁed up to a function fI(p,q).T h a t i s ,
dI = ˆ dI + fI where ˆ dI is a particular solution of (30) and (31).
We now turn to the proof of the third statement. We know from the
preceding that
P
I(ˆ dI + fI)=D where D is known. Since any particular
solution must also satisfy
P
I ˆ dI = D,w eh a v e
P
I fI= 0. Similarly, as
indicated by the ﬁrst-order conditions (7) and (10), any particular solution










rI = −ˆ pI
33and, consequently, gI is homogeneous of degree zero in p and hI is homo-
geneous of degree one in p. Finally, from Lemma 8, any particular solution


















and, consequently, fI is symmetrical.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 4




















































































































That means that, according to A2, the sign of the eﬀect of a variation in the
bargaining power on the level of private and public goods is deﬁned.
34A.4 Proof of Proposition 6
The ﬁrst statement of Proposition 6 is trivial. Since separability implies that:
∂qI
∂q0 =0 , (32)
the individual cm-demands for private goods are identiﬁed up to a function
gI(p), which is independent of q.
We now turn to the second statement. Using (32) and Lemma 8, sym-







































The individual cm-demands are then exactly identiﬁed.
We consider the constraints of the separability of public goods. First of
all, we have seen that the demands for private goods have to satisfy (32).
However, there are other constraints resulting from separability. The ﬁrst-
order condition can be written as follows:














If we take the logarithm of this expression, we obtain the following functional
equation:
lnpI =l nrI + F[f(rI,x I,p),q]+g(rI,x I,p),
where f = µI, g =l n( ∂µI/∂xI)
−1 and F =ln[(∂uI/∂q)/(∂uI/∂µI)].D i ﬀer-












































= I · h
2(rI,x I,p),
where I is the identity matrix, h1(rI,xI,p)=(∂f/∂rI)/(∂f/∂xI) and h2(rI,
xI,p)= ( ∂f/∂pj)/(∂f/∂xI). That is, the right-hand side of these expressions
is equal to a symmetric matrix with identical diagonal elements and is inde-
pendent of q. There is a last constraint: the individual prices must satisfy
cm-symmetry at the individual level
BC o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e D a t a
The order in which the selection criteria were applied, and their eﬀects in
terms of the number of observations deleted using each criteria, is given in
T a b l eB 1 .T h en u m b e ro fc a n d i d a t eo b s e rvations (which could theoretically
be used in the estimation process) is equal to 32,346. The most important
selection is due to the deletion of households with children. The number
of incomplete observations is small, since the missing values in instruments
were imputed by their sample means. These incomplete observations include
mainly rural households because, for conﬁdentiality reasons, the region of
residence of these households is not known. The descriptive statistics of the
sample are given in Table B2.
36Table B1: Selection Criteria of the Sample
Total number of observations 96,949
Attrition in the family survey — 35,258
Single headed households — 29,345
Total number of candidate observations 32,346
Households with members > 65 years — 6,396
Household with children — 18,361
Households with part-time (or non) working members — 4,703
Incomplete observations (rural households & topcoding) — 282
Remaining sample 2,604
Notes: Topcoding refers to the replacement of data, for conﬁdentiality
reasons, when the absolute value of the original data exceeds the allow-
able limits.
37Table B2: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
Mean St.D.
Quantities (expenditure/prices)
Men’s clothing 3.137 3.792
Women’s clothing 5.183 5.895
Food and beverages at home 23.794 9.680
Food and beverages away from home 13.238 12.273
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 5.052 5.340
Personal care services 2.411 1.840
Oil fuel and utility natural gas service 4.366 4.190
Electricity, water and sewer 9.048 4.790
and trash collection services
Prices (base 1980-1984 = 100)
Men’s clothing 117.099 13.352
Women’s clothing 118.036 15.209
Food and beverages at home 127.353 21.542
Food and beverages away from home 129.042 21.782
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 147.401 37.491
Personal care services 129.950 23.088
Oil fuel and utility natural gas service 99.437 9.561
Electricity, water and sewer 119.576 16.742
and trash collection services
Socio-demographic variables
Husband’s education in years 17.656 11.316
Wife’s education in years 17.858 11.106
Husband’s age in years 43.267 12.077
Wife’s age in years 40.925 11.751
Proportion of black households 0.048 0.213
Proportion of Hispanic households 0.033 0.180
Proportion of North residents 0.217 0.413
Proportion of South residents 0.303 0.460
Proportion of Midwest residents 0.264 0.441
Proportion of West residents 0.215 0.411
38References
[1] Altonji J.G., 1986. “Intertemporal Substitution in Labor Supply: Evi-
dence from Micro Data”. Journal of Political Economy 94: S176—S215.
[2] Apps P. and R. Rees, 1997. “Collective Labor Supply and Household
Production”. J o u r n a lo fP o l i t i c a lE c o n o m y105: 178—190.
[3] Becker G.S., 1991. A Treatise on the Family. Enlarged Edition. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
[4] Blundell R., P.A. Chiappori, T. Magnac and C. Meghir, 2001. “Col-
lective Labor Supply: Heterogeneity and Nonparticipation”. Working
Paper 01/19, Institute of Fiscal Studies.
[5] Bourguignon F., M. Browning and P.A. Chiappori, 1995. “The Collec-
tive Approach to Household Behavior”. Working-Paper 95—04, DELTA.
[6] Browning M., F. Bourguignon, P.A. Chiappori and V. Lechene, 1994.
“Incomes and Outcome: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Alloca-
tion”. Journal of Political Economy 102: 1067—1096.
[7] Browning M. and P.A. Chiappori, 1998. “Eﬃcient Intra-household Allo-
cations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests”. Economet-
rica 66: 1241—1278.
[8] Browning M., 1999. “Modelling Commodity Demands and Labour Sup-
ply with m—Demands”. Discussion Paper 99/08, Institute of Economics,
University of Copenhagen.
[9] Chiappori P.A., 1988. “Rational Household Labor Supply”. Economet-
rica 56: 63—90.
[10] Chiappori P.A., 1992. “Collective Labor Supply and Welfare”. Journal
of Political Economy 100: 437-467.
[11] Chiappori P.A., 1997. “Introducing Household Production in Collective
Models of Labor Supply”. Journal of Political Economy 105: 191—209.
[12] Chiappori P.A., R. Blundell and C. Meghir, 2002. “Collective Labour
Supply with Children”. Working Paper 02/08, Institute for Fiscal Stud-
ies.
39[13] Chiappori P.A. and I. Ekeland, 2001a. “The Micro Economics of Group
Behavior 1: General Characterization”. Manuscript, University of
Chicago.
[14] Chiappori P.A. and I. Ekeland, 2001b. “The Micro Economics of Group
Behavior 2: Identiﬁcation”. Manuscript, University of Chicago.
[15] Chiappori P.A., B. Fortin and G. Lacroix, 2002. “Marriage Market, Di-
vorce Legislation and Household Labour Supply”. Journal of Political
Economy 110: 37—72..
[16] Couprie H., 2003. “Time Allocation within the Family: Welfare Impli-
cations of Life in a Couple”. Manuscript, GREQAM, Université de la
Méditerranée.
[17] Cutler D. and L. Katz, 1992. “Rising Inequality? Changes in the Distri-
bution of Income and Consumption in the 1980’s”. American Economic
Review 82: 546—551.
[18] Donni O., 2001. “Collective Female Labor Supply: Theory and Ap-
plication”. Working Paper N◦ 141, CREFE, University of Quebec at
Montreal.
[19] Donni O., 2002. “A Simple Model of Collective Consumption”. Working
Paper, CIRPEE, University of Quebec at Montreal.
[20] Donni O., 2003. “Collective Household Labor Supply: Nonparticipation
and Income Taxation”. Journal of Public Economics 89: 1179—1198.
[21] Donni O. and N. Moreau, 2003. “Collective Female Labor Supply: A
Conditional Approach”. Manuscript, CIRPEE, Université du Québec à
Montréal.
[22] Fong Y. and J. Zhang, 2001. “The Identiﬁcation of Unobservable In-
dependent and Spousal Leisure”, Journal of Political Economy 109:
191—202.
[23] Fortin B. and G. Lacroix, 1997. “A Test of the Collective and Unitary
Model of Labour Supply”. Economic Journal 107: 933—955.
[24] Hayashi F., 2000. Econometrics. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
40[25] Lewbel A., M. Browning and P.A. Chiappori, 2003. “Estimating Con-
sumption Economies of Scale, Adult Equivalence Scales, and Household
Bargaining Power”. Manuscript, Boston College.
[26] Madden P., 1991. “A Generalisation of Hicksian q Substitutes and Com-
plements with Application to Demand Rationing”. Econometrica 59:
1497—1508.
[27] Mazzocco M., 2003. “Indvidual Euler Equations rather than Household
Euler Equations”. Manuscript, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
[28] Meghir C. and G. Weber, 1996. “Intertemporal Nonseparability or Bor-
rowing Restrictions? A Disaggregate Analysis Using a U.S. Consump-
tion Panel”. Econometrica 64: 1151—1181.
[29] Myles G., 1995. Public Economics. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
[30] Neary J. and K.W.S. Roberts, 1980. “The Theory of Household Behavior
under Rationing”. European Economic Review 13: 25—42.
[31] Nelson J., 1988. “Household Economies of Scale in Consumption: The-
ory and Evidence”. Econometrica 56: 1301-1314.
[32] Newey W. and K. West 1987. “Hypothesis Testing with Eﬃcient Method
of Moments Estimation”. International Economic Review 28: 777—787.
[33] Slesnick D., 1993. “Gaining Ground: Poverty in the postwar United
States”, Journal of Political Economy 101: 1—38.
[34] Thomas D., D. Contreras and E. Frankenberg, 1997. “Child Health and
the Distribution of Household Resources at Marriage”. Working Paper,
RAND, University of California at Los Angeles.
41